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A Catholic Perspective on 
Marriage and the Gift of 
Children—With Special 
Attention to Herman 
Dooyeweerd’s Social Ontology 
of Marriage1 
by Eduardo J. Echeverria
Marriage is grounded in God’s purpose for 
creation. It is the two-in-one-flesh union of a man 
and a woman, with conjugal love being the inte-
grating principle of the whole communion of mar-
riage and family life. Gaudium et spes stated it this 
way: “Marriage and conjugal love are by their na-
ture ordained toward the begetting and educating 
of children. Children are really the supreme gift 
of marriage” (no. 50). In this short paper, I discuss 
the question of how the good of marriage is related 
to the gift of children, according to the Catholic 
tradition. The answer to this question presup-
poses an understanding of the nature of marriage 
and the corresponding reasons for getting mar-
ried. In the twentieth century, particularly in the 
fundamental theological accounts, for example, of 
Dietrich von Hildebrand (1929), Pius XI in Casti 
Connubii (1930), and Karol Wojtyla (1960), but 
also of Reformed philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd 
(1936 [1957]), who appreciably engages the thought 
of Pius and Hildebrand, leading up to Vatican II’s 
Gaudium et spes 47-53, the focus of these accounts 
had to do with the question whether marriage is a 
good in itself, an intrinsic good, that is to be sought 
for its own sake; or it is an instrumental good, neces-
sary for something else, particularly for having chil-
dren. In the development of the Church’s teaching 
on marriage, some theologians gave a strong person-
alist tone to marriage as a community of love, but 
did so by opposing love to procreation; others con-
tinued to insist that procreation takes precedence 
over love. Either way of framing the relationship be-
tween the good of marriage and the gift of children 
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concupiscence”); finally, for Christians the goodness 
of marriage is found also in its sacramental charac-
ter, by making marriage indissoluble: “Therefore the 
good of marriage in every nation and for all man-
kind lies in the purpose of procreation and in chaste 
fidelity; but for the people of God, it lies also in the 
holiness of the sacrament, by reason of which it is 
forbidden for a woman, for so long as her husband 
lives, to marry another, even if she has been put 
away by her husband, and not even in order to have 
children....These, therefore, are the goods that make 
marriage good—offspring, fidelity, sacrament.”4
Another thinker illustrating the complexity of 
the answer to this question is St. Thomas Aquinas. 
He distinguishes between marriage’s primary and 
secondary ends. The former end is the good of chil-
dren, and the latter is the mutual help that husband 
and wife give each other in marital life. Leading 
Catholic moral theologian, the late Germain 
Grisez, explains why, in Aquinas’s view, these two 
ends are natural: “Marriage is natural in respect to 
its primary end, since nature intends that children 
be not only born but brought up, and this requires 
the lasting tie between the parents in which mar-
riage consists. Marriage also is natural in respect 
to its second end: ‘For, just as natural reason dic-
tates that people dwell together, since individuals 
are not self-sufficient for everything that pertains to 
life—which is why human beings are said to be po-
litical by nature—so, of those activities which are 
required for human life, some are better suited to 
men and others to women, so that nature inclines 
toward a certain association of man with woman, 
which is matrimony’.”5 For Aquinas, the sacrament 
of marriage also has the purpose of properly order-
ing concupiscence to marriage’s ends, by virtue of 
the sacrament’s healing grace. Therefore, Aquinas 
confirms Augustine’s view that “marriage is not 
good in itself but only as instrumental to the pro-
creation and raising of children.” Nevertheless, 
Grisez argues that Aquinas’s thought, too, exhibits 
a certain complexity.
Aquinas coordinates marriage’s ends with the 
goods of marriage: “[T]he principal end pertains 
to the human couple according to their generic 
nature, which they share with other animals, and 
thus having and raising children is a good marriage. 
The secondary end of marriage, which pertains to 
was rejected in Gaudium et spes, which formulated 
this relationship as the natural ordering of marriage 
and conjugal love to procreation. This paper gives 
a short treatment of how Catholicism reached that 
formulation. I conclude with some reference to Pope 




To begin with, St. Augustine’s thinking on 
this question of the relationship of marriage and 
children is complex. On the one hand, he defends 
the goodness of marriage against the charge that 
Catholics favored the Manicheans because of the 
pride of place they ascribed to holy virginity in 
contrast to marriage. In defending the goodness of 
marriage as an intrinsic good, Augustine affirms the 
marriage of persons known to be infertile: “[T]here 
is good ground to inquire for what reason it [mar-
riage] be a good. And this seems not to me to be 
merely on account of the begetting of children, but 
also on account of the natural society itself in a dif-
ference of sex. Otherwise it would not any longer be 
called marriage in the case of old persons, especially 
if either they had lost sons, or had given birth to 
none. But now in good, although aged, marriage, 
albeit there has withered away the glow of full age 
between male and female, yet there lives in full vig-
or the order of charity between husband and wife.”2 
On the other hand, he holds that marriage is an 
instrumental good. Augustine says, “Truly we must 
consider, that God gives us some goods, which are 
to be sought for their own sake, such as wisdom, 
health, friendship: but others, which are necessary 
for the sake of others, such as learning, meat, drink, 
sleep, marriage, sexual intercourse. For of these cer-
tain are necessary for the sake of wisdom, as learn-
ing: certain for the sake of health, as meat and drink 
and sleep: certain for the sake of friendship, as mar-
riage or sexual intercourse: for hence subsists the 
propagation of the human kind, wherein friendly 
fellowship is a great good.” In short, he concludes, 
“it is good to marry, because it is good to beget chil-
dren, to be a mother of a family.”3 But this is not the 
only reason why marriage is good. 
The good of friendship is realized in procreation, 
as well as the fidelity of chastity by properly order-
ing our sexual desires (hence providing a “remedy for 
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the human couple precisely as human, is coopera-
tion in the activities necessary for life; thus, the 
spouses owe each other fidelity, which is another of 
the goods of marriage. Beyond these natural ends, 
marriage among Christians has the end of signify-
ing the union of Christ and the Church, and so 
the sacrament is a good of marriage.” Furthermore, 
by coordinating the good of fidelity with coopera-
tion, the question arises whether this good is in-
trinsic to marriage itself. Although Aquinas himself 
never raises this question, 
Grisez argues that an affir-
mative answer to it is im-
plicit in Aquinas’ thought: 
“Marriage has its first per-
fection from its own form—
the intrinsic principle which 
makes it what it specifically 
is—and he describes this 
form as the ‘indivisible join-
ing of souls, by which each 
spouse is bound to maintain 
unbreakable fidelity with the other (Summa theo-
logiae 3, q. 29, a. 2).”6 Moreover, adds Grisez, in 
Aquinas’ view friendship is not listed among the 
ends or goods of marriage, but by virtue of mar-
riage’s indissolubility Aquinas argues for “maxi-
mum friendship between husband and wife, since 
they share not only marital intercourse but the 
whole of domestic life (see Summa Contra Gentiles, 
3, 123).”
The Catechism of the Council of Trent
First published under the authority of St. Pius 
V in 1566, the Catechism of the Council of Trent 
answers the question regarding the reasons that a 
man and a woman should be joined in marriage.7 
In the Catechism’s teaching we find not only a fresh 
restatement of traditional doctrine—offspring, fi-
delity, and sacrament—but also an addition and, in 
this connection, a reordering of Aquinas’s primary 
and secondary ends of marriage: 
First of  all, nature itself  by an instinct implanted 
in both sexes impels them to such companionship, 
and this is further encouraged by the hope of  mu-
tual assistance in bearing more easily the discom-
forts of  life and the infirmities of  old age. 
 A second reason for marriage is the desire 
of  family, not so much, however, with a view to 
leave after us heirs to inherit our property and for-
tune, as to bring up children in the true faith and 
in the service of  God….It was also for this reason 
that God instituted marriage from the beginning.
A third reason has been added, as a consequence 
of  the fall of  our first parents. On account of  the 
loss of  original innocence the passions began to 
rise in rebellion against right reason; and man, 
conscious of  his own frailty and unwilling to fight 
the battles of  the flesh, is 
supplied by marriage with 
an antidote by which to 
avoid sins of  lust.
 These are ends, some 
one  of  which, those who 
desire to contract marriage 
piously and religiously, as 
becomes the children of  the 
Saints, should propose to 
themselves.
I noted earlier that St. Augustine had recognized 
“the natural companionship [societas] between the 
two sexes” as a good of marriage. It didn’t find its in-
tegral place in his understanding of the reasons for 
marrying. But in the Catechism’s teaching it finally 
does: “nature itself by an instinct implanted in both 
sexes impels them to such companionship [soci-
etas].” Furthermore, the order is reversed of primary 
and secondary ends. What was primary in Aquinas’ 
thought, namely, offspring, becomes secondary, and 
what was secondary, the mutual help that spouses 
give each other, is now seen as a subordinate aspect 
of the first reason. Still, the Catechism advances 
and hence brings a certain addition to bear upon 
the reasons for marrying by prioritizing the com-
panionship of man and woman to which nature in-
clines. Thus, this companionship—and not just the 
mutual help that spouses give each other—is mar-
riage itself rather than being extrinsic to marriage’s 
nature. Significantly, then, the Catechism teaches 
that marriage itself is a reason to marry, an intrinsic 
good—pace St. Augustine—that should be sought 
after for its own sake. 
Moreover, as in the traditional view, marriage 
serves to order properly sexual desires. There, mar-
riage is considered as a sacrament signifying the 
First published under the 
authority of St. Pius V in 
1566, the CateChism of the 
CounCil of trent answers 
the question regarding the 
reasons that man and 
a woman should be joined 
in marriage.
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union of Christ and the Church and, hence, the 
indissolubility of marriage.
Development of Magisterial Teaching on 
Marriage
The segue to magisterial teaching of Pius XI and 
Pius XII is well described by Germain Grisez as the 
dominance of a legalistic mentality of a canonical 
definition of marriage regarding “all issues about 
the meaning and value of marriage.” In the 1917 
Code of Canon Law, the code defines marriage in 
terms of primary and secondary ends: “The prima-
ry end of matrimony is the procreation and raising 
of offspring; the secondary, mutual help and the 
remedy for concupiscence.” In this canonical light, 
the view that marriage is an instrumental good 
for having and raising children overshadowed the 
catechetical gains that had been expressed in the 
Catechism of the Council of Trent. Grisez explains: 
“However, that view’s very dominance provoked 
the emergence of an antithesis: Even if the primary 
end of marriage and marital intercourse is the pro-
creation and raising of children, still marriage has 
an intrinsic value and meaning, the spouses’ union 
in mutual love, and since chaste marital intercourse 
expresses this value and meaning, it too has an in-
herent significance. The two views’ incompatibility 
and the plausibility of the second led to a develop-
ment in Catholic teaching on marriage.”8
The development alluded to here by Grisez 
found its expression in Pius XI’s 1930 encyclical 
Casti connubii.9 Pius integrates the canonical defi-
nition of marriage into his account but does not or-
ganize his teaching around the notions of primary 
and secondary ends. Yes, he holds on to the notion 
that the having and raising of children holds pride 
of place in marriage. Still, Pius’ synthesis will be 
unique by ordering the goods of children, mutual 
help, chaste marital intercourse, etc., in regards to 
conjugal faith, the good of fidelity, which implicitly 
includes the “ fostering of conjugal love,” according 
to Grisez, “among the secondary ends of both mar-
riage and the marital act.”10 Says Pius, “This con-
jugal faith, however, which is most aptly called by 
St. Augustine the ‘faith of chastity’ blooms more 
freely, more beautifully and more nobly, when it is 
rooted in that more excellent soil, the love of hus-
band and wife which pervades all the duties of mar-
ried life and possesses a certain primacy of nobility 
in Christian marriage” (no. 23). He explains, “The 
love, then, of which We are speaking is not that 
based on the passing lust of the moment nor does 
it consist in pleasing words only, but in the deep 
attachment of the heart which is expressed in ac-
tion, since love is proved by deeds. This outward 
expression of love in the home demands not only 
mutual help but must go further; must have as its 
primary purpose that man and wife help each other 
day by day in forming and perfecting themselves in 
the interior life, so that through their partnership 
in life they may advance ever more and more in 
virtue” (no. 23). 
Pius concludes by referring us back to the 
Catechism of the Council of Trent: “This mutual 
molding of husband and wife, this determined ef-
fort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense, 
as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the 
chief reason and purpose [causa et ratio] of matri-
mony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the 
restricted sense as instituted for the proper concep-
tion and education of the child, but more widely as 
the blending of life as a whole [communion] and 
the mutual interchange and sharing thereof [com-
panionship and association]” (no. 24). Thus, conju-
gal love is the integrating principle of marital com-
munion, bringing about its intrinsic perfection, by 
“pervading all the duties of married life and pos-
sesses a certain primacy of nobility in Christian 
marriage.” Such love is expressed by action and 
includes mutual help, with its primary purpose be-
ing that of the spouses helping each other to grow 
in virtue and holiness. Grisez rightly summarizes 
Pius’ teaching: “In this way, Pius not only recalls 
the catechism’s teaching but implies that Christian 
marriage is in itself a vocation and way of holiness. 
Thus, he supplies another ground for questioning 
the view that marriage is good only as instrumental 
to offspring.”11
Still, in reaction against the canonical defini-
tion of marriage and the corresponding legalistic 
mentality, some theologians (e.g., Herbert Doms) 
ascribed primacy to Pius’ teaching that marriage 
should be viewed “more widely as a communion, 
companionship, and association of life as a whole,” 
and took his point about not restricting marriage 
to the having and raising of children, by regard-
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ing the latter as extrinsic to the good of marriage, 
and thus children are seen as accidental (“optional 
extra”) to marriage’s intrinsic meaning. This reac-
tion evoked a reply in 1944 from the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, with the confirma-
tion of Pius XII, declaring inadmissible the opinion 
of those who “either deny that the primary end of 
marriage is the generation and education of chil-
dren, or teach that the secondary ends are not es-
sentially subordinate to the primary end, but are 
equally principal and inde-
pendent.”12 Although this 
statement does not give an 
account of the whole com-
munion of marriage and 
family life, it does make 
clear that it is inadmis-
sible to displace parenthood 
from its central place in the intrinsic good of mar-
riage. In sum, says Grisez, “There remained only 
one alternative: to treat parenthood as part of the 
communion of married life.”13 And leading up to 
Vatican II, that is precisely what some thinkers did. 
I turn now to Dietrich von Hildebrand, Herman 
Dooyeweerd (who, although not Catholic but 
Reformed, engages the thought of Hildebrand and 
Pius XI), and Karol Wojtyla (the future Pope John 
Paul II). 
Prior to Vatican II
Significant thinkers in this tradition, such as 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, affirm the primacy of 
love in marital communion14: “[Marriage] exists 
in the first place for its own sake and not exclu-
sively for the sake of any result that it produces.” 
Hildebrand adds, “No other earthly community 
is constituted so exclusively in its very substance 
by mutual love.”15 He advances the thesis that the 
meaning of the sexual act in marriage, given that 
marriage is in itself, principally, a communion of 
love, may not be restricted to being a mere means 
to procreation. So, the meaning of marriage, con-
jugal love, in its interpersonal and unitive aspect 
is a good in itself16: “Its meaning is primarily the 
realization of the sublime communion of love in 
which, according to the words of our Savior, ‘They 
shall be two in one flesh’ (Matt 19:5).”17
Briefly, how does Scripture frame its under-
standing of marriage? In Mt 19:3-8, the words 
of Jesus Christ refer back to the Genesis texts of 
1:27 and 2:24. “Back-to-creation” is the leitmotif 
in Jesus’ teaching. In his own teaching regarding 
marital monogamy and indissolubility (Mark 10:6-
9; Matt 19:4-6), creation texts in Genesis 1-2 have 
foundational importance, in particular Gen 1:27 
and 2:24: “Male and female he created them” and 
“for this reason… a man will be joined to his wife 
and the two will become one flesh.” These texts 
are absolutely normative for 
marriage, indeed, for sexual 
ethics.18 Jesus unites into an 
inextricable nexus the con-
cepts of permanence, twon-
ess, and sexual complemen-
tarity.19 Yes, Genesis 2:24 
is about the permanence 
of marriage; it is also about the exclusivity of the 
relationship: “twoness”20; but it also is about the 
fundamental prerequisite of complementary sexual 
differentiation for effecting the “two-in-one-flesh” 
union of man and woman: “So then they are no 
longer two but one flesh” (Mark 10:8).21 Indeed, 
as Pruss rightly notes, “the text [Genesis 2:24] is 
a seminal scriptural text on the nature of human 
sexuality.”22 In short, marriage is a comprehensive, 
multi-dimensional (e.g., fiducial, rational, emo-
tional, volitional, and bodily-sexual) unity founded 
on (and not only given expression in but also inter-
nally constituted by) a singular act of physical unity 
that is a sign and seal of two becoming one flesh. 
Yes, marriage is about more than sex, but it is also 
about nothing less than sex. In other words, bodily 
union (sexual intercourse and not just fleshly con-
tact, rubbing bodies together) between a man and 
a woman, uniting biologically or organically in the 
bodily dimension of their being, is uniquely fitting 
for creating a bodily communion of persons that is 
generative. Thus, “only a unitive act can be genera-
tive, and only a generative act can be unitive—in 
that only it makes two ‘one flesh’.”23 In short, the 
form of love that is marriage is founded through 
a bodily sexual union of man and woman as one 
flesh. One flesh unity is the body’s language for one-
life unity. This bodily-sexual union is not extrin-
sic to the mutual self-giving love that it signifies or 
symbolizes. Of course it is a sign or symbol of that 
Jesus unites into an 
inextricable nexus the 
concepts of permanence, 
twoness, and sexual 
complementarity.19
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mutual love, but that is precisely what it is in real-
ity because the human body is part of the personal 
reality of the human being—a one-flesh union—
and not an extrinsic instrument of the self.24 The 
body is intrinsic to one’s own self, not surprisingly, 
since the “human body shares in the dignity of the 
image of God.”25 But since the body is intrinsic to 
personhood, the nature of marriage is such that it 
requires sexual difference, the bodily-sexual act, as 
a foundational prerequisite, indeed, as also intrinsic 
to a one-flesh union. In short, only a sexual union 
of male and female persons makes bodies in any 
real sense “one flesh” (Gen. 2:24), with the latter 
organic bodily union being a necessary condition 
for the existence of conjugal marriage.
Returning to Hildebrand, we find that he has 
no intention of detaching the bodily union of mar-
ried love from the essential unfolding of this act in 
the primary end of procreation. Indeed, the “gen-
eral connection between procreation and the com-
munion of love must always be maintained even 
subjectively, at least as a general possibility of this 
act.”26 He adds, “Love is the primary meaning of 
marriage according to the creation [Schöpfungssinn 
der Ehe], just as its primary end according to the 
creation [Schöpfungszweck] is the begetting of new 
human beings.”27 Although Hildebrand leaves un-
explained here the relation between “meaning” and 
“end,” it is clear throughout his book that the re-
lationship is such that this end and others are to 
be realized on the basis of marital love as its inte-
grating principle. Put differently, marital love is the 
integrating principle of the intimate interpersonal 
two-in-one-flesh union in which husband and 
wife reciprocally complement one another in their 
mutual self-donation, bringing to fulfillment the 
meaning of marriage in and through these ends—
offspring, fidelity, mutual help, sacrament.28
Dooyeweerd’s Social Ontology of Marriage29
Because he, too, affirms the primacy of love in 
marital communion, the Dutch Reformed philoso-
pher Herman Dooyeweerd also values Pius XI’s, 
Casti Connubii. As we noted above, Pius writes, 
“This mutual molding of husband and wife, this 
determined effort to perfect each other, can in a 
very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches, 
be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matri-
mony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the 
restricted sense as instituted for the proper concep-
tion and education of the child, but more widely as 
the blending of life as a whole and the mutual in-
terchange and sharing thereof” (no. 24). Although 
Pius explained the blessings of marriage in terms 
of the three goods of marriage, namely, offspring, 
conjugal faith, and the sacrament, it is clear from 
this passage that husband and wife should seek 
to realize these goods according to its integrating 
principle, which is conjugal love. Dooyeweerd re-
marks, “This encyclical frankly assigned ‘primary 
of honor’ (principatus nobilitatis) to married love 
in a Christian marriage. All this was in striking 
contrast with what happened in Protestant circles 
two years later, when the moral theologian Emil 
Brunner published his book Das Gebot und die 
Ordnungen, in which love, if viewed as the basis of 
marriage, was called a ‘sandy ground’ and marital 
love was identified with erotic inclination!”30 
Dooyeweerd raises a similar objection to what 
he calls the “rationalistic conception of married 
love as essentially a ‘blind passion’….When this in-
dividualistic rationalism found its way in Protestant 
ethics there was of course no longer any possibility 
of a really Christian notion of married love as the 
most intense moral bi-unity. Symptomatic is the ut-
terance recorded by P. Kluckhohn of the Methodist 
preacher William Whitefield (1714-1770), who 
boasted that in his proposal of marriage there 
had been no question of love: ‘God be praised, if I 
know my own heart a little I am free of that fool-
ish passion which the world calls love’. This shows 
how far the rationalistic utilitarian spirit of the 
Enlightenment had penetrated under the guise of 
Puritan piety.”31 Hildebrand follows up his citation 
of the Methodist Whitefield with an old Catholic 
prayer that speaks of marriage as “the mystery of 
love”: “O God, at the creation of mankind, making 
woman from man Thou hast already ordained that 
there should be a union of the flesh and of sweet 
love….Lord our God, Thou has created man pure 
and immaculate and still Thou wishest that in pro-
creation of the generations one be made from the 
other by the mystery of love.”32 
Dooyeweerd gratefully acknowledges that 
“[Hildebrand] voices the Biblical-Christian con-
ception of the conjugal bond as a typical and in-
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comparable institutional love-union between hus-
band and wife, [and] as the expression of the eternal 
love of Christ towards the Church as His Bride.”33 
Not entirely taken with Hildebrand’s book, how-
ever, Dooyeweerd also claims that Hildebrand 
“detaches the inner meaning-structure of married 
love from its temporal biotic foundation in the 
organic difference between the sexes.” But this is 
simply not the case. Hildebrand explicitly asserts 
the contrary: “The special character of conjugal 
love is, furthermore, marked 
by the fact that this love can 
only come into being, be-
tween men and women and 
not between persons of the 
same sex, as is the case with 
friendship, parental love, or 
filial love.”34 
Still, Dooyeweerd right-
ly holds that “Marriage is 
… intrinsically qualified 
as a moral community of 
love for the duration of the 
common life-span of two 
persons of different sex.” The moral aspect of this 
love relationship (its qualifying or leading func-
tion), shows an individuality type that “refers back 
to … the organic life-aspect of the conjugal rela-
tion, namely, the lasting sexual biotic bond be-
tween husband and wife.” Strictly speaking, “The 
moral individuality-type of the conjugal love-com-
munity is typically [emphasis added] founded in the 
sexual-biotic function of marriage.”35 As he argues 
elsewhere, the internal structural principle of the 
marital love-communion, the ethical aspect of this 
love-community being its qualifying function, may 
not be detached from, in Dooyeweerd’s words, “its 
biotic foundation in the organic difference between 
the sexes.”36 Again, he says, “According to its two 
radical functions (the moral and biotic functions) 
the marriage community can be described as a 
community of moral life-long love between hus-
band and wife based on a relatively durable organic 
sexual bond.”37 
It would take us too far afield here to discuss 
the nature of the unity in becoming “one flesh.” 
Along with many contemporary Catholic think-
ers, such as the late Germain Grisez, John Finnis, 
Robert George, Patrick Lee, John Paul II,38et al., 
Dooyeweerd argues that the internal structural 
principle of the marital love-communion, the 
ethical aspect of this love-community being its 
qualifying function, may not be detached from, 
in Dooyeweerd’s words, “its biotic foundation in 
the organic difference between the sexes.” In other 
words, Dooyeweerd upholds the conjugal view of 
marriage in which two people—a man and a wom-
an—who unite in marriage, must, in addition to 
other things, unite organi-
cally, meaning thereby in 
the bodily-sexual dimen-
sion of their being—mar-
riage’s founding function 
(in Dooyeweerd’s terms). 
Suffice it to say, therefore, 
that essential to a Christian 
understanding of marriage 
is the normative significance 
of sexual differentiation: the 
male-female prerequisite is 
the foundational structural 
dimension of the God-
ordained conjugal view of marriage, essential for 
nuptial intimacy and openness to the gift of life. 
Complementary sexual differentiation is divinely 
intended in the order of creation; hence bodily-sex-
ual union is a necessary condition for marriage, in 
order for its unitive and procreative ends to be real-
ized. Thus, “only a unitive act can be generative, 
and only a generative act can be unitive—in that 
only it makes two ‘one flesh’.”39 As Dooyeweerd 
explains, 
The marriage bond, as such, is typically founded 
in the institutional (and not in an incidental) 
sexual union of husband and wife, which is un-
doubtedly made serviceable for the propagation 
of the human race. It is according to the order of 
the creation that normally marriage leads to the 
formation of a family. In other words, the typi-
cal foundational relation between the family and 
the conjugal bond implies the natural disposition of 
the latter to procreation. In this sense marriage may 
be called the “germ-cell” of the family-relationship. 
Both communities remain most intensely interwo-
ven during the time of their actual existence. Yet 
marriage, as a love-communion, maintains its own 
In short, only a sexual 
union of male and female 
persons makes bodies in 
any real sense "one flesh" 
(Gen. 2:24), with the latter 
organic bodily union being a 
necessary condition 
for the existence of 
conjugal marriage.
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structure notwithstanding its interwovenness with 
the family.40
Thus, Dooyeweerd holds that “marriage, as 
a love-communion, maintains its own structure 
notwithstanding its interwovenness with the fam-
ily.”41 It would take us too far afield to elaborate 
Dooyeweerd’s conceptual articulation of that inter-
wovenness in light of his notion of enkaptic inter-
lacement. For now, let us consider his brief elabora-
tion of that interwovenness. He writes,
 After having gained a sufficient insight into the 
inner structure of  the marriage bond [as a bi-
unitary love-communion founded on the organic 
unity of  biotic complementarity] we shall now try 
to deepen our insight into its inner coherence with 
the family. According to the divine order of  creation mar-
riage is intentionally adapted to the family relationship. [T]
his means that marriage is enriched and deepened 
by its natural interweaving with the family relation-
ship, and conjugal love is deepened and enriched 
in parental love….When the marriage bond has 
expanded into a family relationship the former is 
enriched and deepened in its meaning by its close 
interweaving with the latter, because its bi-unity 
in conjugal love has produced a unity in plural-
ity. In the conjugal union, as such, the expression 
of  the personality in the temporal existence of  
each of  the married persons is enriched, enlarged 
and completed by that of  the other. A woman be-
comes “wife” in the full sense of  the word only 
in the conjugal union with her husband, and vice 
versa. And the expression of  the personality in the 
bi-unitary bond assumes a wider and deeper per-
spective in the multi-unitary bond of  the family.42
Dooyeweerd wishes to affirm marriage’s intrin-
sic value, an interpersonal union that is in itself 
good, rather than to see marriage as a mere instru-
mental good for the extrinsic purposes of having 
and raising children. He correctly understands 
that the internal meaning-structure of married 
love may not be detached from “its biotic founda-
tion in the organic difference between the sexes.”43 
Dooyeweerd also holds that the marriage bond, as 
a love-communion, is typically founded in sexual 
difference: the organic unity of male and female 
in conjugal sex is the foundational function of the 
structural whole that is marital union. 
In the above passage, on the one hand, he makes 
it clear that that this union is naturally fulfilled by 
bearing and raising children. Thus, he does not dis-
place parenthood as an integral part of the commu-
nion of married life. Still, Dooyeweerd insists, on 
the other hand, “[I]t is not possible to deduce the es-
sential internal structure of the marriage-bond from 
the ‘cosmic purpose of propagation’, as was [alleg-
edly] done by Thomas Aquinas.” “This traditional 
universalistic construction,” adds Dooyeweerd, 
“necessarily results in an eradication of the bound-
aries between the marriage union and the family 
relationship.”44 The eradication of the boundaries 
between marriage and family is, he argues, implied 
by Aquinas’ attempt to deduce the essential internal 
structure of the marriage-bond from the “cosmic 
purpose of propagation.” He writes,
This is evident from Thomas’ statement that pos-
terity is essential to the marital bond [4 Sent. Dist. 
31, q. I, a. 3, c]. Such a construction must natu-
rally restrict itself to a deduction of the general 
institution of marriage from the purpose of pro-
creation….[But] in its application to the factual 
relationships [of marriage] Thomas’ view leads to 
constructions of a very artificial and internally 
contradictory character. We need only mention his 
explanations of the relation between the individual 
act of sexual uniting and the “objective procreative 
purpose.” Thomas concedes that sexual intercourse 
in a barren marriage, or in general such which is 
not carried on with a concrete procreative inten-
tion, is morally permissible. But then it will not do 
to seek the inner essence of the conjugal institution in 
the aim of propagation. Then the internal structure 
of the marriage bond, in its difference from the 
family relationship, irresistibly forces itself upon 
us….The marriage bond… normally embraces 
husband and wife for life, independent of the 
natural procreative end. No “rational procreative 
purpose” can justify the sexual consummation of 
marriage in an ethical sense, but only married love 
sanctified in Christ. This love (and not a utilitarian 
kind of thought) is the true regulator and educator 
of married life towards temperance and chastity. In 
the divine order of creation, marriage is the only 
ordered way to form a family; marriage and family 
are mutually adapted to each other. But they retain 
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their own peculiar internal structure and value. If 
this is ignored or misinterpreted, our marital mo-
rality will result in a labyrinth of contradictions of 
our own creating, and the lucid simplicity of the 
divine ordinance [of marriage] will be obscured.45 
Dooyeweerd’s main point is right: marriage 
isn’t merely for having children, as if to say that it 
is merely a means to the procreative end. Indeed, it 
is precisely for this reason that, in 1936, as I noted 
above, Dooyeweerd already 
expressed his appreciation 
for the work of Catholic 
philosopher Dietrich von 
Hildebrand on marriage, 
Die Ehe (1929).
Wojtyla’s Reflection on 
Marriage
Karol Wojtyla, too, re-
jects the idea that marriage 
is a means to an end, and hence he agrees with 
Dooyeweerd’s point as well as Hildebrand’s. In his 
1960 work, Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla rejects 
what he calls the “rigorist and puritan interpreta-
tion” of the conjugal life and sexual intercourse, 
which sees the latter as instrumental goods serving 
the purpose of procreation.46 Wojtyla carefully dis-
tinguishes this interpretation from the Manichean 
tradition because “this view does not reject mar-
riage as something evil that in itself is evil and un-
clean due to being ‘bodily’ as was maintained by 
the Manicheans.” Rather, it “contents itself with 
stating the permissibility of marriage for the sake 
of the good of the species.”47 Against this view, 
Wojtyla argues, “By joining in sexual intercourse, 
a man and a woman join themselves as rational 
and free persons, and their union has a morel value 
when it is justified by true conjugal love. Hence, if 
we can say that the Creator ‘uses’ the sexual union 
of persons to realize the order of existence intended 
by him within the species Homo sapiens, it definite-
ly may not be held that the Creator uses persons 
merely as means to an end intended by himself.” 
In response to the question why is this so, Wojtyla 
then adds,
For the Creator, by giving man and woman a ratio-
nal nature and the ability to determine consciously 
their acts, gave them thereby the power to choose 
by themselves the end to which sexual intercourse 
leads in a natural way. And where two persons can 
choose together a certain good as an end, there 
the possibility of love also exists. Therefore, the 
Creator does not use persons merely as means or 
tools of his creative power, but opens before them 
the possibility of a particular realization of love. 
It depends on them whether 
they will place their sexual 
intercourse on the level of 
love, on the level proper to 
persons, or below this level. 
And the Creator wills not 
only the preservation of the 
species through sexual inter-
course, but also its preser-
vation based on love that is 
worthy of persons.48 
So, Wojtyla’s claim here is no different from 
Dooyeweerd’s point that the inner essence of mar-
riage may not be sought in the purpose of hav-
ing children; rather, absolutely peculiar about the 
meaning of the marital bond is the constant love-
union between husband and wife. Furthermore, 
like Hildebrand, Wojtyla regards procreation to be 
the primary end of marriage because “procreation 
is objectively, ontologically, a more important pur-
pose than that man and woman should live togeth-
er, complement each other and support each other 
(mutuum adiutorium), just as this second purpose 
is in turn more important that the appeasement of 
natural desire.”49 Wojtyla clarifies here that each of 
the traditional reasons for marriage, namely, the 
having and raising of children, mutual help, and 
remedium concupiscentiae, which is a legitimate ori-
entation for desire, are all expressions of “love as a 
virtue.” He adds, “However, opposing love to pro-
creation or indicating a primacy of procreation over 
love is out of the question.”50 Wojtyla elaborates:
Besides, the realization of these ends is a complex 
fact. A complete, positive exclusion of the possibil-
ity of procreation undoubtedly diminishes or even 
eliminates the possibility of durable, mutual co-
He correctly understands 
that the internal meaning-
structure of married love 
may not be detached from 
"its biotic foundation in 
the organic difference 
between the sexes."
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education of the spouses themselves. Procreation 
unaccompanied by this co-education and co-striv-
ing for the highest good would also be in a certain 
sense incomplete and incompatible with the love 
of the person. Indeed, the point here is not only 
and exclusively the material multiplication of the 
headcount within the human species, but also ed-
ucation—whose natural substratum is the family 
based on marriage—cemented by mutuum adiuto-
rium. If an interior cooperation between a woman 
and a man exists in marriage, and if they know 
how to educate and complement…each other, 
then their love matures to become the basis of the 
family. However, marriage is not identified with 
family and always remains, above all, an intimate 
union of two people.51 
Thus, significantly, for Wojtyla, just as it is for 
Hildebrand and Dooyeweerd, love is not an end of 
marriage; rather, love is the single, that is, integral 
but complex meaning of marriage that is expressed 
and fulfilled in each of these ends, though most es-
sentially and fully in procreation, which is the pri-
mary end of marriage. In the transition to Vatican 
II, I conclude with Hildebrand: “Marriage, as well 
as the marital act, has meaning not only because 
of procreation, but also as the expression and ful-
fillment of a deep union of love.”52 This position, 
emphasizing the centrality of conjugal love in 
Christian marriage, but without opposing love to 
procreation nor yet of suggesting that procreation 
takes precedence over love, will receive an adequate 
treatment in Gaudium et spes. In the next section 
of this paper, I turn to give a brief account of that 
treatment. 
Gaudium et spes 
Although Vatican II’s Gaudium et spes53 con-
sciously avoids the language of primary and sec-
ondary ends, it nevertheless affirms the truth be-
hind the traditional formulation by stating that the 
having and raising of children naturally belongs to 
the full unfolding of marriage, with conjugal love 
being the integrating principle: “By their very na-
ture, the institution of matrimony itself and conju-
gal love are ordained for the procreation and educa-
tion of children, and find in them their ultimate 
crown” (no. 48). On this view, conjugal love is the 
“vivifying source,” as Grisez puts it, “of the whole 
communion of marriage and family life.” Conjugal 
love is, in Gaudium et spes, the integrating principle 
in its reflections on marriage and the family. Grisez 
explains: “Marriage and the family are a ‘commu-
nity of love’ (no. 47); marriage itself is an ‘intimate 
community of conjugal life and love’ (no. 48); 
conjugal love ‘is uniquely expressed and perfected 
through the marital act’ and such acts ‘signify and 
foster that mutual self-giving by which spouses en-
rich each other with joyful and grateful hearts’ (no. 
49); the fruitfulness of marriage is treated as the 
fulfillment of conjugal love: [‘Marriage and con-
jugal love are by their nature ordained toward the 
begetting and educating of children. Children are 
really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute 
very substantially to the welfare of their parents’.]; 
and the problem of birth regulation [responsible 
parenthood] is seen as one of harmonizing conjugal 
love with respect for life (see no. 51).”54 In short, 
adds Grisez, according to Gaudium et spes, “con-
jugal communion is designed to be, and normally 
is, an intrinsically good part of a larger, intrinsi-
cally good whole: the family. Thus, parenthood, 
is the intrinsic fulfillment of the intimate union 
of persons [of husband and wife] and actions.”55 
Avoiding the language of primary and secondary 
ends, but still affirming the truth that parenthood 
is essential to the meaning of marriage, he implies 
that children are not the end to which marriage is 
an instrumental good; nor are they a means, some-
times even seen as an optional extra, to the couple’s 
fulfillment. Rather, the having and raising of chil-
dren are the realization and hence fulfillment of the 
good of the marital communion of conjugal love. 
This teaching was reconfirmed by John Paul II in 
Familiaris consortio (1981)56:
In its most profound reality, love is essentially a 
gift; and conjugal love, while leading the spouses 
to the reciprocal “knowledge” which makes them 
“one flesh,” does not end with the couple, because 
it makes them capable of the greatest possible gift, 
the gift by which they become cooperators with 
God for giving life to a new human person. Thus 
the couple, while giving themselves to one anoth-
er, give not just themselves but also the reality of 
children, who are a living reflection of their love, a 
permanent sign of conjugal unity and a living and 
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education of the spouses themselves. Procreation 
unaccompanied by this co-education and co-striv-
ing for the highest good would also be in a certain 
sense incomplete and incompatible with the love 
of the person. Indeed, the point here is not only 
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headcount within the human species, but also ed-
ucation—whose natural substratum is the family 
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and a man exists in marriage, and if they know 
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then their love matures to become the basis of the 
family. However, marriage is not identified with 
family and always remains, above all, an intimate 
union of two people.51 
Thus, significantly, for Wojtyla, just as it is for 
Hildebrand and Dooyeweerd, love is not an end of 
marriage; rather, love is the single, that is, integral 
but complex meaning of marriage that is expressed 
and fulfilled in each of these ends, though most es-
sentially and fully in procreation, which is the pri-
mary end of marriage. In the transition to Vatican 
II, I conclude with Hildebrand: “Marriage, as well 
as the marital act, has meaning not only because 
of procreation, but also as the expression and ful-
fillment of a deep union of love.”52 This position, 
emphasizing the centrality of conjugal love in 
Christian marriage, but without opposing love to 
procreation nor yet of suggesting that procreation 
takes precedence over love, will receive an adequate 
treatment in Gaudium et spes. In the next section 
of this paper, I turn to give a brief account of that 
treatment. 
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Although Vatican II’s Gaudium et spes53 con-
sciously avoids the language of primary and sec-
ondary ends, it nevertheless affirms the truth be-
hind the traditional formulation by stating that the 
having and raising of children naturally belongs to 
the full unfolding of marriage, with conjugal love 
being the integrating principle: “By their very na-
ture, the institution of matrimony itself and conju-
gal love are ordained for the procreation and educa-
tion of children, and find in them their ultimate 
crown” (no. 48). On this view, conjugal love is the 
“vivifying source,” as Grisez puts it, “of the whole 
communion of marriage and family life.” Conjugal 
love is, in Gaudium et spes, the integrating principle 
in its reflections on marriage and the family. Grisez 
explains: “Marriage and the family are a ‘commu-
nity of love’ (no. 47); marriage itself is an ‘intimate 
community of conjugal life and love’ (no. 48); 
conjugal love ‘is uniquely expressed and perfected 
through the marital act’ and such acts ‘signify and 
foster that mutual self-giving by which spouses en-
rich each other with joyful and grateful hearts’ (no. 
49); the fruitfulness of marriage is treated as the 
fulfillment of conjugal love: [‘Marriage and con-
jugal love are by their nature ordained toward the 
begetting and educating of children. Children are 
really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute 
very substantially to the welfare of their parents’.]; 
and the problem of birth regulation [responsible 
parenthood] is seen as one of harmonizing conjugal 
love with respect for life (see no. 51).”54 In short, 
adds Grisez, according to Gaudium et spes, “con-
jugal communion is designed to be, and normally 
is, an intrinsically good part of a larger, intrinsi-
cally good whole: the family. Thus, parenthood, 
is the intrinsic fulfillment of the intimate union 
of persons [of husband and wife] and actions.”55 
Avoiding the language of primary and secondary 
ends, but still affirming the truth that parenthood 
is essential to the meaning of marriage, he implies 
that children are not the end to which marriage is 
an instrumental good; nor are they a means, some-
times even seen as an optional extra, to the couple’s 
fulfillment. Rather, the having and raising of chil-
dren are the realization and hence fulfillment of the 
good of the marital communion of conjugal love. 
This teaching was reconfirmed by John Paul II in 
Familiaris consortio (1981)56:
In its most profound reality, love is essentially a 
gift; and conjugal love, while leading the spouses 
to the reciprocal “knowledge” which makes them 
“one flesh,” does not end with the couple, because 
it makes them capable of the greatest possible gift, 
the gift by which they become cooperators with 
God for giving life to a new human person. Thus 
the couple, while giving themselves to one anoth-
er, give not just themselves but also the reality of 
children, who are a living reflection of their love, a 
permanent sign of conjugal unity and a living and 
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inseparable synthesis of their being a father and a 
mother (no. 14).  
In the final section of this paper, I turn to Pope 
Francis’ 2016 post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation, 
Amoris Laetitia.57
Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia
Vatican II’s teaching is heartily reconfirmed 
again in Amoris Laetitia (hereafter AL). Pope 
Francis writes (AL, no. 80), 
Marriage is firstly an “in-
timate partnership of life 
and love” [Gaudium et spes 
48] which is a good for the 
spouses themselves, while 
sexuality is “ordered to the 
conjugal love of man and 
woman” [Catechism of the 
Catholic Church, no. 2360]. 
[Thus] the conjugal union is 
ordered to procreation “by its very nature” [Gaud-
ium et spes 48].58 
In this light we can understand that Francis, 
too, gives a strong personalist tone to marriage as a 
community of love, but does not do so by opposing 
love to procreation or by insisting that procreation 
takes precedence over love. He says, in short, “Love 
always gives life” (AL, no. 165):
The child who is born “does not come from out-
side as something added on to the mutual love of 
the spouses, but springs from the very heart of that 
mutual giving, as its fruit and fulfilment” [Cat-
echism of the Catholic Church, no. 2366]. He or 
she does not appear at the end of a process, but is 
present from the beginning of love as an essential 
feature, one that cannot be denied without disfig-
uring that love itself. From the outset, love refuses 
every impulse to close in on itself; it is open to 
a fruitfulness that draws it beyond itself. Hence 
no genital act of husband and wife can refuse this 
meaning [Humanae vitae, nos. 11-12], even when 
for various reasons it may not always in fact beget 
a new life. A child deserves to be born of that love, 
and not by any other means, for “he or she is not 
something owed to one, but is a gift” [Catechism of 
the Catholic Church, no. 2378], which is “the fruit 
of the specific act of the conjugal love of the par-
ents” [Donum vitae, II, 8]. This is the case because, 
“according to the order of creation, conjugal love 
between a man and a woman, and the transmis-
sion of life are ordered to each other (cf. Gen 1:27-
28). Thus the Creator made man and woman share 
in the work of his creation and, at the same time, 
made them instruments of his love, entrusting to 
them the responsibility for the future of mankind, 
through the transmission of human life” [Relatio 
Finalis 2015, 63].
Furthermore, emphasiz-
ing that the child should be 
welcomed as a gift of God, 
as he does in the above pas-
sage, Francis also affirms 
that the “family is the setting 
in which new life is not only 
born but also welcomed” 
(AL, no. 166), with open-
ness and affection, regardless of the circumstances. 
Indeed, he adds, “The gift of a new child, entrusted 
by the Lord to a father and a mother, begins with 
acceptance, continues with lifelong protection and 
has as its final goal the joy of eternal life. By serenely 
contemplating the ultimate fulfillment of each hu-
man person, parents will be even more aware of the 
precious gift entrusted to them” (Ibid). Moreover, 
the gift character of the child entails his immense 
worth, his uniqueness, irreplaceability, and hence 
may never be used for one’s own ends. Rather, chil-
dren should be loved unconditionally. “This love,” 
Francis states, “is shown to them through the gift 
of their personal name, the sharing of language, 
looks of love and the brightness of a smile. In this 
way, then learn that the beauty of human relation-
ships touches our soul, seeks our freedom, accepts 
the difference of others, recognizes and respects 
them as a partner in dialogue” (AL, no. 172). 
In this context, Francis emphasizes the impor-
tance of children being raised by a married mother 
and father and, hence, of the complementarity of 
the sexes in parenting because mothers and fathers 
are not interchangeable (AL, nos. 172-76). This 
emphasis fits well his rejection of “an ideology of 
gender that ‘denies the difference and reciprocity in 
nature of a man and a woman and envisages a soci-
Moreover, the gift 
character of the child 
entails his immense 
worth, his uniqueness, 
irreplaceability, and 
hence may never be used 
for one's own ends.
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ety without sexual differences, thereby eliminating 
the anthropological basis of the family’” (AL, no. 
56; nos. 285-286).
One final point regarding Francis’ reflections 
on children pertains to their moral formation, as 
well as their education in the faith (AL, nos. 287-
290), and sex education (AL, nos. 280-85). In 
short, Francis is persuaded that civilization depends 
on strong, stable marriages and hence families for 
integral human development (AL, nos. 274-278). 
Parents are the primary educators of their children, 
and hence of their moral formation as well, which 
includes their sex education. Indeed, he says, “the 
family is the first school of human values, where 
we learn the wise use of freedom” (AL, no. 274). 
He says, “A person’s affective and ethical develop-
ment is ultimately grounded in a particular experi-
ence, namely, that his or her parents can be trusted. 
This means that parents, as educators, are respon-
sible, by their affection and example, for instilling 
in their children trust and loving respect” (AL, 
no. 263). Included in this moral formation is the 
shaping of the will, the good of the intellect, by 
developing good habits with the aim of “interior-
izing values into sound and steady ways of acting” 
(AL, no. 266). This interiorizing is about the for-
mation of virtues, which is a steadfast inner prin-
ciple of operation.” Francis adds, “The virtuous life 
thus builds, strengthens and shapes freedom, lest 
we become slaves of dehumanizing and antisocial 
inclinations” (AL, no. 267). In this connection, it 
is important to see that Francis opposes any theory 
of nurturing, of child-rearing, which transfers or 
replaces the uniquely indispensable responsibility 
of parents, of mother and father, to specialists and 
experts, rendering it a professional task outside the 
family, particularly by the state. To use a handy 
phrase coined by Peter and Brigitte Berger in their 
significant study on the family,59 Francis decidedly 
opposes the “professionalization of parenthood.”60
Mindful that this was one of the brain-storm-
ing papers at the bi-annual meeting (December 
2, 2017) of Evangelicals and Catholics Together, 
enough was said in this paper about marriage and 
family to begin a conversation on the nature and 
ends of marriage and family.
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